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Evidence Rulemaking:                                      
Balancing the Separation of Powers  
THOMAS A. BISHOP  
In State v. DeJesus, the Connecticut Supreme Court asserted its common law 
supervisory authority to adopt a rule of evidence that contradicts a rule on the 
same subject in Connecticut’s Code of Evidence, adopted by the judges of the 
superior court in 2000.  Questions raised by the DeJesus opinion relate to the 
inherent power of the judiciary, at any level, to adopt rules of evidence and the 
relationship among courts in a hierarchical system in which higher courts have 
supervisory authority over those below.  Although decisional law suggests that a 
state’s highest court has the inherent rulemaking and supervisory power to create 
evidence rules for trial courts, the unsettled judicial and legislative reaction to 
DeJesus provides a warrant for the Connecticut Supreme Court to adopt the Code 
of Evidence in collaboration with the General Assembly. 
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Evidence Rulemaking:                                    
Balancing the Separation of Powers  
THOMAS A. BISHOP* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2008, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued an en banc opinion in 
State v. DeJesus, in which a plurality of the divided court asserted its 
common law supervisory authority to fashion a rule of evidence contrary to 
an applicable provision of the Connecticut Code of Evidence (the “CCE” 
or the “Code”) previously adopted by the judges of the superior court.1  
DeJesus has elicited lively reactions in Connecticut’s legal community, 
provoking debate regarding the nature and scope of a court’s rulemaking 
authority as it relates to the law of evidence, and casting doubt on the 
continuing reliability of Connecticut’s code as a definitive source of state 
evidentiary law.2  
This Article is an effort to analyze the questions raised by DeJesus and 
to determine its implications for the future of the law of evidence in 
Connecticut.  It starts with an overview of the DeJesus opinions.  It then 
explores the nature and scope of the inherent powers of the judiciary 
generally, a consideration of the judiciary’s rulemaking power, and the 
interplay between a trial court’s rulemaking authority and a higher court’s 
supervisory role.  This Article concludes that the judiciary’s authority to 
promulgate an evidence code in a legislative manner properly falls within 
the judiciary’s rulemaking power, but suggests, nevertheless, that it would 
be preferable for the Connecticut Supreme Court to adopt the CCE with the 
cooperation of the state’s General Assembly, rather than unilaterally adopt 
a code of evidence. 
                                                                                                                          
* Judge of the Connecticut Appellate Court.  The author also serves as the Chairperson of the 
Evidence Oversight Committee of the Connecticut Judicial Branch.  The views expressed in this Article 
are solely those of the author. 
1 See State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 59 (Conn. 2008) (agreeing with the defendant that the 
adoption of the CCE did not divest the court of its power to “develop and change Connecticut’s rules of 
evidence on a case-by-case basis”). 
2 In the 2010 Cumulative Supplement to Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence, the authors 
comment, in regard to the continuing viability of the CCE, that “[t]he net effect of the various opinions 
in DeJesus is cloudy at best,” and that “attorneys or trial judges who now rely on the Code do so at 
their peril.”  COLIN C. TAIT & HON. ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT 
EVIDENCE § 1.3.2 (4th ed. Supp. 2010).  Colin C. Tait is a Professor of Law at the University of 
Connecticut School of Law and has served as the official reporter of the Judicial Branch’s Evidence 
Oversight Committee. 
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II.  STATE V. DEJESUS 
In DeJesus, the defendant was convicted of two counts of kidnapping 
in the first degree and two counts of sexual assault in the first degree.3  At 
trial, the jury heard evidence that Carlos DeJesus had kidnapped and 
sexually assaulted the same victim in 2000 and 2001.4  The trial court also 
admitted evidence that, in 2000, DeJesus had assaulted a different victim 
under circumstances similar to the incidents for which he was on trial.5  
The State claimed, and the trial court agreed, that the evidence of prior 
misconduct was admissible to show intent, common plan, and scheme.6  A 
majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court determined that DeJesus was 
entitled to a new trial on the kidnapping charge relating to the 2000 
incident on the basis of an instructional error.7  But the court was divided 
on the proper response to DeJesus’s claim regarding the admission of 
uncharged misconduct evidence as it pertained to the sexual assaults.8  At 
trial, the court admitted this evidence on the basis of CCE § 4-5 which, 
while barring evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove bad 
character or criminal tendencies, permits such evidence to prove intent, 
identity, malice, motive, common plan, or scheme.9  Although the supreme 
court disagreed with the trial court’s reason for allowing the evidence, the 
court nonetheless deemed it admissible as propensity evidence.10  In doing 
so, the court fashioned a new exception to the CCE’s prohibition against 
the admission of evidence of prior misconduct.  Writing for the plurality, 
Chief Justice Chase Rogers stated: 
First, evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct is admissible 
only if it is relevant to prove that the defendant had a 
propensity or a tendency to engage in the type of aberrant 
                                                                                                                          
3 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 48–49. 
4 Id. at 50. 
5 Id. at 50–51. 
6 Id.  
7 Id. at 58–59. 
8 Six of the seven justices agreed to reverse the kidnapping charge related to the 2000 incident 
and remand it for retrial on the basis that the trial court should have instructed the jury that, in order to 
find the defendant guilty of kidnapping, it had to find that the defendant intended to prevent the 
victim’s liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than was necessary to commit the 
sexual assault.  Id. at 53.  Justice Joette Katz, in dissent, expressed the view that the trial evidence was 
insufficient to find the defendant guilty of the 2000 kidnapping and, therefore, DeJesus was entitled to 
an acquittal on that charge.  Id. at 91 (Katz, J., dissenting).  
9 At the time of the DeJesus trial, CCE § 4-5 provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
(a) . . . [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is inadmissible to 
prove the bad character or criminal tendencies of that person.  (b) . . . [e]vidence of 
other crimes, wrongs or acts of a person is admissible for purposes other than those 
specified in subsection (a), such as to prove intent, identity, malice, motive, common 
plan or scheme, absence of mistake or accident, knowledge, a system of criminal 
activity, or an element of the crime, or to corroborate crucial prosecution testimony. 
CONN. EVID. CODE § 4-5 (1999). 
10 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 49. 
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and compulsive criminal sexual behavior with which he or 
she is charged.  Relevancy is established by satisfying the 
liberal standard pursuant to which evidence previously was 
admitted under the common scheme or plan exception.  
Accordingly, evidence of uncharged misconduct is relevant 
to prove that the defendant had a propensity or a tendency to 
engage in the crime charged only if it is: “(1) . . . not too 
remote in time; (2) . . . similar to the offense charged; and (3) 
. . . committed upon persons similar to the prosecuting 
witness.”11   
In adopting this new common law rule, the court effectively overruled 
CCE § 4-5 as to certain cases and adopted, in its place, a basis for 
admission that the rule had previously rejected.12  Six of the seven 
members of the court agreed that, in the exercise of its common law 
powers, the court could adopt a rule at variance with Connecticut’s Code 
of Evidence, while Justice Joette Katz strongly disagreed.  Based on the 
history of the development of the CCE, Justice Katz posited that the 
supreme court was bound by the terms of the CCE, and that the adoption of 
the CCE by the judges of the superior court had effectively abrogated the 
common law authority of the supreme court to adopt evidentiary rules in 
conflict with the CCE.13 
The majority view that the court was not bound by the CCE was 
reported in three opinions, marked more by their dissimilarities than by 
their common conclusions.  In her plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rogers 
wrote that although the language of the code was ambiguous as to whether 
its adoption was intended to oust the supreme court from common law 
                                                                                                                          
11 Id. at 78 (quoting State v. McKenzie-Adams, 915 A.2d 822, 845 (Conn. 2007)).  
12 The rule itself was based on decisional law.  See, e.g., State v. Kulmac, 644 A.2d 887, 897 
(Conn. 1994) (“As a general rule, evidence of prior misconduct is inadmissible to prove that a criminal 
defendant is guilty of the crime of which the defendant is accused.  Such evidence cannot be used to 
suggest that the defendant has a bad character or a propensity for criminal behavior.” (internal citations 
omitted)).  The history of the CCE is set forth in DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 74–78. It may be summarized as 
follows.  In 1991, the then co-chairperson of the General Assembly’s Judiciary Committee asked the 
Connecticut Law Revision Commission to study the feasibility of legislative enactment of a code.  
Subsequently, a committee of judges and attorneys, led by Justice David Borden, drafted a proposed 
code, which was submitted to the Judiciary Committee for adoption in 1998.  Instead of adopting the 
code, however, the co-chairperson of the Judiciary Committee communicated to (then) Chief Justice 
Robert Callahan a desire that such a code be adopted by the judges of the superior court through their 
rulemaking authority rather than by legislative enactment.  In response, Chief Justice Callahan 
appointed a committee of judges and attorneys, led by Justice Katz, to review the proposed code, to 
recommend any changes and additions, and then to submit it to the Rules Committee of the superior 
court for consideration.  Ultimately, the judges of the superior court adopted the code in 2000.  In 
conjunction, the Evidence Code Oversight Committee was appointed by the Chief Justice and the 
judges of the superior court to monitor the development of the law of evidence and to make 
recommendations to the superior court for future revision and clarification of the CCE.  Justice Katz 
was appointed to chair this committee.  
13 DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 90–91, 103–04 (Katz, J., dissenting). 
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evidence-making, it would be “illogical to conclude that, by adopting the 
code for the purposes of ease and convenience, the judges intended to 
divest this court of its long-standing inherent common-law adjudicative 
authority over evidentiary law.”14  Chief Justice Rogers continued:  
[W]e conclude that the judges of the Superior Court did not 
intend for the committee to recommend substantive changes 
to the common-law evidentiary rules codified in the code, 
but, rather, intended for the committee simply to recommend 
revisions reflecting common-law developments in 
evidentiary law, clarifications of the code to resolve 
ambiguities and additions to the code in the absence of 
governing common-law rules.  Stated simply, we conclude 
that the code was not intended to displace, supplant or 
supersede common-law evidentiary rules or their 
development via common-law adjudication, but, rather, 
simply was intended to function as a comprehensive and 
authoritative restatement of evidentiary law for the ease and 
convenience of the legal community.15  
In a concurring opinion, Justice Richard Palmer found no uncertainty 
in the language of the CCE or its commentary regarding whether the 
judges intended, by their adoption of a code, to supplant the supreme 
court’s evidentiary law-making ability.16  Rather, Justice Palmer affirmed 
the supreme court’s ultimate authority over the trial court in regard to the 
development of the law of evidence as well as to rules for practice and 
procedure generally.17 
Justice Peter Zarella wrote a separate concurring opinion in which he 
agreed with the plurality’s conclusion regarding its continuing common 
law adjudicative authority, but, unlike Justice Palmer, Justice Zarella 
asserted a distinction, based on Connecticut’s particular history, between 
the supreme court’s rulemaking function regarding evidence and its 
authority to adopt rules of practice and procedure.18 
At the outset, the separate opinions in DeJesus raise for discussion the 
nature and scope of the inherent authority of the judiciary, at any court 
level, to promulgate rules for the judicial process. 
                                                                                                                          
14 Id. at 66. 
15 Id. at 68. 
16 Id. at 83 (Palmer, J., concurring). 
17 Id. at 83–86. 
18 Although Justice Zarella drew a distinction between the court’s common law authority 
regarding the development of the law of evidence and the superior court’s rulemaking authority, he did 
not opine as to whether the result in this case would have been different if a provision of the Practice 
Book, rather than the Code of Evidence, had been at issue.  Id. at 89–90 (Zarella, J., concurring). 
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III.  THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE JUDICIARY’S INHERENT AUTHORITY 
The term “inherent authority” is used in this Article to signify an 
unspoken but essential attribute of the judiciary, necessary for a court’s 
performance of its judicial function.  One court defined inherent powers as 
those which the court may use “in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the 
administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and 
integrity” and which are “not derived from legislative grant or specific 
constitutional provision, but from the very fact that the court has been 
created and charged by the constitution with certain duties and 
responsibilities.”19  
Since its onset, the American judiciary has claimed an inherent power 
to act in a manner it has perceived as necessary to maintain its integrity and 
to carry out the essential function of adjudication through an orderly and 
fair process.  As early as 1812, the U.S. Supreme Court asserted that 
federal courts have certain implied powers simply because they are courts 
and that these powers “cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they 
are necessary to the exercise of all others.”20  Nine years later, in Anderson 
v. Dunn, the Court noted that “courts of justice are universally 
acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose 
silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their 
lawful mandates . . . .”21  And, nearly a century later, the Court commented 
that “[i]n the very nature of things the courts of each jurisdiction must each 
be in a position to adopt and enforce their own self-preserving rules.”22  
                                                                                                                          
19 Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979).  But see Hon. James R. Wolf, 
Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an Independent Judiciary, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV 507, 517 (2002) 
(making a distinction between inherent and implied powers).  Judge Wolf states: 
Inherent powers refer to the exercise of powers that are reasonably necessary for the 
conduct of a court’s constitutional functions and that grow out of the court’s 
jurisdiction.  Implied powers are those that arise out of and are necessary to carry 
out the authority expressly granted and contemplated either constitutionally or 
legislatively. 
Id.   
A sampling of decisions suggests that courts do not uniformly make Judge Wolf’s distinction 
between inherent and implied powers.  See, e.g., In Re Petition of Fla. State Bar Ass’n, 21 So. 2d 605, 
607 (Fla. 1945) (“So this Court has approached the rule making power in a pragmatic way and has not 
become involved in the niceties of such concepts as inherent power to make rules or the delegation of 
the rule making power.  It is idle to contend that there is not an area in which constitutional courts may 
not exercise the inherent or implied power to prescribe rules of procedure.”); Moity v. La. State Bar 
Ass’n, 121 So. 2d 87, 90 (La. 1960) (“The courts of final jurisdiction of this and other states have 
discussed the inherent or implied power of the judiciary, and found that embraced therein is the power 
to prescribe rules and regulations for those seeking admission to the Bar . . . .”); Vogel v. State, 291 
N.W.2d 838, 845 (Wis. 1980) (“All rules of evidence are intended to, and do, affect the integrity of the 
fact-finding process. . . . Sec. 908.01(4)(a) 1 was adopted with this goal in mind.  As such, it represents 
an appropriate exercise of this court’s inherent and implied power. . .”).  While there may, in fact, be a 
distinction between inherent and implied powers, this Article follows those cases in which the terms 
appear to be used interchangeably.  
20 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812).  
21 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821).  
22 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915). 
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More recently, the Court characterized a court’s implied power as that 
which is “squeezed from the need to make the court function.”23  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed the notion of inherent powers 
in this manner: 
[W]hen the people by means of the Constitution established 
courts, they became endowed with all judicial powers 
essential to carry out the judicial functions delegated to  
them. . . .  But the Constitution makes no attempt to catalogue 
the powers granted. . . . These powers are known as 
incidental, implied, or inherent powers, all of which terms are 
used to describe those powers which must necessarily be 
used by the various departments of government, in order that 
they may efficiently perform the functions imposed upon 
them by the people.24   
A review of decisional law reveals, as well, that while the notion of the 
inherent authority of the court is firmly ingrained in our jurisprudence, its 
assertion cannot be justified beyond that which is necessary for the proper 
functioning of the judiciary and the preservation of its integrity.  In short, it 
is generally held that courts should not posit unstated authority beyond that 
which is necessary to carry out their allotted functions.25  
IV.  RULEMAKING POWER 
Courts have been held to have the inherent authority to act in a broad 
range of ways to promote a judicial process that features balance, fairness, 
and integrity.26  At the trial level, a court’s inherent powers include the 
                                                                                                                          
23 Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991) (quoting Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television 
& Radio, Inc., 894 F.2d 696, 702 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
24 State v. Cannon, 226 N.W. 385, 386 (Wis. 1929). 
25 See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 823 (1996) (characterizing a court’s inherent 
powers as those necessary to protect the court’s proceedings and judgments); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 
(characterizing inherent power as the power to do what is reasonably necessary to enable the court to 
discharge its judicial responsibilities and to provide for the orderly administration of justice).  In 1984, 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit commented: “Federal courts have both the inherent power 
and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to 
carry out Article III functions.”  In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984), cited with 
approval in In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 n.8 (1989).  
26 There are many examples of the exercise of a court’s inherent authority, subject to the 
supervision of the jurisdiction’s highest court.  See, e.g., Bank of N.S. v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 
254–57 (1988) (dismissing an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct before a grand jury); 
Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 577–81 (1984) (disregarding a departmental 
seniority system in fashioning a remedy for plaintiffs who demonstrated that their employer’s 
termination practices were discriminatory); United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980) 
(suppressing evidence seized in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights); United States v. 
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231 (1975) (requiring production of previously recorded witness statements); 
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1970) (barring a disruptive defendant from the courtroom); 
Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–30 (1962) (dismissing a case sua sponte for lack of 
prosecution); Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520, 521, 523 (1944) (vacating a judgment and entering a new 
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following: the regulation of trial practice and procedure; docket control; 
and the supervision and discipline of attorneys.  As to the federal courts, 
the U.S. Supreme Court opined in 1864 that “Circuit Courts, as well as all 
other Federal courts, have authority to make and establish all necessary 
rules for the orderly conducting [sic] business in the said courts, provided 
such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States.”27 
At the state level, the Connecticut Supreme Court stated in 1950: 
Apart from legislative authority, courts acting in the exercise 
of common-law powers have an inherent right to make rules 
governing procedure in them.  That right is an inheritance 
from the common-law practice in England.  That the courts 
of this state, without any legislative authority, may make 
rules of procedure appears from a decision of the Supreme 
Court made in 1807.28   
More recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court observed that a court 
has the “inherent power to regulate proceedings before it to the extent 
reasonably necessary to discharge its judicial responsibilities and to 
provide for the efficient administration of justice.”29  In a like-minded 
opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court observed that, “[w]ith respect to the 
issue of trial court jurisdiction, ‘it has generally been recognized that  
courts . . . have inherent power to prescribe rules to regulate their 
proceedings and to facilitate the administration of justice.’”30 
The Colorado Supreme Court expressed a constitutional and pragmatic 
                                                                                                                          
one with the effect of extending a party’s right to appeal); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 
(1936) (staying proceedings); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114–15 (1932) (modifying 
an injunction in adaption to changed conditions, even though it was originally entered by consent); 
Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40, 63 (1903) (admitting a defendant to bail); Schoonmaker v. Lawrence 
Brunoli, Inc., 828 A.2d 64, 94 (Conn. 2003) (assessing attorney’s fees against a party who has acted in 
“‘bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons’” (quoting Fattibene v. Kealey, 558 A.2d 
677, 685 (Conn. App. 1989))); Audobon Parking Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Barclay & Stubbs, Inc., 626 
A.2d 729, 733 (Conn. 1993) (summarily enforcing the terms of a settlement agreement); Palomba v. 
Gray, 543 A.2d 1331, 1333 (Conn. 1988) (setting aside an unreasonable jury verdict); Friedlander v. 
Friedlander, 463 A.2d 587, 593 (Conn. 1983) (stating that courts can disregard frivolous pleadings filed 
solely to interrupt the progress of a case).  Apart from rules regulating trial practice and procedure, 
courts have also been held to have the inherent authority to regulate the practice of law, including the 
supervision and disciplining of lawyers, In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643 (1985), and to punish for 
contempt committed in the court’s presence, Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 159–60 (1949).  
27 Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128 (1864).  It is significant that Congress has the 
authority to limit or override rules of the federal courts, because these courts are creatures of statute.  
See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 47 (“It is true that the exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts 
can be limited by statute and rule, for ‘[t]hese courts were created by act of Congress.’” (quoting Ex 
parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 511 (1873))). 
28 Appeal of Dattilo, 72 A.2d 50, 52 (Conn. 1950) (internal citations omitted); see also Power of 
Court to Prescribe Rules of Pleading, Practice, or Procedure, 158 A.L.R. 705, 706–07 (1945), and 
cases cited therein. 
29 Wexler v. DeMaio, 905 A.2d 1196, 1203 (Conn. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
30 Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 136 S.W.3d 455, 458 (Ky. 2004) (quoting Craft v. 
Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961)). 
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rationale for a court’s inherent rulemaking power as follows: 
The judicial power of the state is vested in the courts; the 
legislative and executive departments are expressly forbidden 
the right to exercise it, and the courts, charged with the duty 
of exercising the judicial power, must necessarily possess the 
means with which to effectually and expeditiously discharge 
that duty; this duty can be performed and discharged in no 
other manner than through rules of procedure, and 
consequently this court is charged with the power and duty of 
formulating, promulgating, and enforcing such rules of 
procedure for the trial of actions as it deems necessary and 
proper for performing its constitutional functions.31   
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he inherent 
rulemaking authority of courts of general jurisdiction in this state to 
prescribe rules of practice and rules to regulate their proceedings ‘as justice 
may require’ has an ancient lineage supported by consistent custom, 
recognized by statute and enforced by numerous judicial precedents.”32 
In addition to numerous decisions asserting the judiciary’s inherent 
authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, there was 
scholarly support for the judiciary’s assumption of rulemaking 
responsibility from a policy perspective when this issue was debated in the 
twentieth century.  In 1958, Professors Leo Levin and Anthony Amsterdam 
summarized the position in favor of judicial rulemaking as follows: 
Long ago Pound and Wigmore propounded convincing 
arguments against relying upon legislative management of 
judicial procedure: legislatures have neither the immediate 
familiarity with the day-by-day practice of the courts which 
would allow them to isolate the pressing problems of 
procedural revision nor the experience and expertness 
necessary to the solution of these problems; legislatures are 
intolerably slow to act and cause even the slightest and most 
obviously necessary matter of procedural change to be long 
delayed; legislatures are subject to the influence of other 
pressures than those which seek the efficient administration 
                                                                                                                          
31 Kolkman v. People, 300 P. 575, 584–85 (Colo. 1931); see also Wolf, supra note 19, at 510 
(discussing the theoretical bases for inherent judicial powers).  The Colorado Constitution contains a 
provision regarding separation of powers that states that no branch shall exercise the power of any 
other branch.  COLO. CONST. art. III.  Such a clear delineation is not present in all state constitutions.  
When Connecticut first adopted a written constitution in 1818, an initial committee report proposed 
similar preclusive language, but this language was not ultimately adopted.  WESLEY W. HORTON, THE 
CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 80 (1993). 
32 Op. of the Justices, 688 A.2d 1006, 1011 (N.H. 1997) (quoting Garabedian v. Donald William, 
Inc., 207 A.2d 425, 426 (N.H. 1965)). 
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of justice and may often push through some particular and ill-
advised pet project of an influential legislator while the 
comprehensive, long-studied proposal of a bar association 
molders in committee; and legislatures are not held 
responsible in the public eye for the efficient administration 
of the courts and hence do not feel pressed to constant 
reexamination of procedural methods. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that a very large part 
of maintaining maximum effectiveness in the courts does not 
lie in drastic wholesale procedural reform, but in the 
necessary minor alterations of single rules from time to time 
as experience dictates, and such small matters as these 
inevitably fare badly when they must compete for legislative 
attention. . . .  [Court rules] are the work of an agency whose 
whole business is court business and for whom court 
efficiency can become a major interest, an agency keenly 
aware of the latest problems and fully capable of bringing to 
bear in their early solution a long and solid experience.33   
At this juncture, it appears well-settled that rulemaking power resides 
with state judiciaries, whether by constitutional or statutory grant, or as an 
attribute of the court’s inherent authority to order its process.34   
                                                                                                                          
33 A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rulemaking: A 
Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1958) (footnotes omitted).  
34 The highest state courts have been given rulemaking authority by the following constitutions 
and statutes: ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 150; ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 15 (subject to change by the 
legislature); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 5; ARK. CONST. amend. LXXX, § 3; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 6; 
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 21; DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13(1); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (subject to 
legislative repeal); GA. CONST. art. VI, § 9, para. 1 (providing that the supreme court shall created rules 
“with the advice and consent of the council of the affected class or classes of trial courts”); HAW. 
CONST. art. VI, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; IOWA CONST. art. V, § 4 (giving the supreme court 
supervisory authority and administrative control over all inferior judicial tribunals in the state); KY. 
CONST. § 116; LA. CONST. art. V, § 5; MD. CONST. art. IV, § 18; MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; MO. 
CONST. art. V, § 5; MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2; NEB. CONST. art. V, § 25; N.H. CONST. art. 73-a; N.J. 
CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 3; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2) (giving the supreme court authority to make 
rules of practice and procedure for the appellate division, but giving the general assembly authority to 
make rules for the trial courts); N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B); PA. CONST. art. 
V, § 10(c); S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4 (subject to statutory law); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. 
V, § 31 (so long as not in conflict with statutory law); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 37 (subject to legislative 
revision); VA. CONST. art. 6, § 5 (so long as not in conflict with statutory law); WASH. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 24; W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-212 (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-8-1-3 
(LexisNexis 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-101 (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 1 (2009); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 218, § 43 (West 2005); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.051 (West 2002); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 9-3-61 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2.120 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 
(LexisNexis 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 74 (West 2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 1.006 (2009); R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 16-3-402 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-3-103 
(LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 751.12 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-114 (2009).   
In New York, it appears that the historic authority to create rules lies with the legislature.  N.Y. 
CONST. art. VI, § 30 (providing that “[t]he legislature shall have the same power to alter and regulate 
the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and in equity that it has heretofore exercised”).   
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V.  THE SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY OF HIGHER COURTS 
Although decisional law makes it plain that trial courts have an 
inherent rulemaking authority, these courts are, nevertheless, subject to the 
supervisory authority of their jurisdictions’ highest courts.  Higher courts 
exercise this supervision when they adopt rules, as well as when they 
review trial court rules.  Thus, while trial courts have the inherent authority 
to promulgate rules, this authority is subject to appellate review.  This 
principle is illustrated by Frazier v. Heebe, in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court was confronted with a residency rule promulgated by a district court 
in Louisiana.  In striking down the rule, the Court opined:  
[A] district court has discretion to adopt local rules that are 
necessary to carry out the conduct of its business.  This 
authority includes the regulation of admissions to its own  
bar. . . . This Court may exercise its inherent supervisory 
power to ensure that these local rules are consistent with “the 
principles of right and justice.”35   
The same principle applies to rules of practice and procedure.  In this 
regard, the U.S. Supreme Court has asserted its “supervisory authority over 
the federal courts . . . to prescribe rules of evidence and procedure that are 
binding in those tribunals.”36  One example of this exercise is found in 
                                                                                                                          
Connecticut stands alone in regard to its tradition of judicial rulemaking by the trial court.  Rules 
of practice and procedure for the trial court have generally been adopted by the judges of the superior 
court and not the supreme court.  In Connecticut, where the constitution is silent regarding the 
rulemaking power, Connecticut General Statutes section 51-14 grants to each constitutional court the 
power to promulgate rules for practice and procedure, subject to disapproval by the general assembly.  
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-14(a)–(b) (2005).  The rule appears to be both a grant of power and a tacit 
acknowledgment of the authority of the respective courts to promulgate rules.  In pertinent part, it 
provides:  
The judges of the supreme court, the judges of the appellate court, and the judges of 
the superior court shall adopt and promulgate and may from time to time modify or 
repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial 
proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules, 
for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of promoting the speedy 
and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits.   
Id. § 51-14(a).   
The rule also, however, contains a provision purporting to authorize the General Assembly to 
review and reject any such rules.  Id. § 51-14(b).  For a detailed history of rulemaking in Connecticut, 
see Richard S. Kay, The Rule-Making Authority and Separation of Powers in Connecticut, 8 CONN. L. 
REV. 1, 8–9, 13–27 (1975). 
35 Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641, 645 (1987) (quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 554 (1968) 
(White, J., concurring)).  
36 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) (citing Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 
416, 426 (1996)).  In United States v. Young, the Supreme Court observed that  
[w]e have long recognized that the courts of appeals may prescribe rules of conduct 
and procedure to be followed by district courts within their respective  
jurisdictions. . . . [A]n “appellate court will, of course, require the trial court to 
conform to constitutional mandates, but it may likewise require it to follow 
procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice although 
in nowise commanded by statute or by the Constitution.” 
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Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States,37 in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated, “[o]ur review of rules adopted by the courts of appeals in their 
supervisory capacity is limited in scope, but it does demand that such rules 
represent reasoned exercises of the courts’ authority.”38  
In addition to its review of district and circuit court rules, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory authority over lower federal 
courts in its adjudicative capacity to establish, prospectively, evidentiary 
and procedural rules to be followed in future cases, and it has, on occasion, 
exercised its inherent supervisory authority to reverse criminal convictions 
obtained against the Court’s sense of fair play and justice.39  
State court jurisprudence is in accord.  In State v. DeJesus, as noted, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court asserted its supervisory authority over the 
administration of justice: 
As this court repeatedly has stated, both the Supreme 
Court and the Appellate Court “possess an inherent 
supervisory authority over the administration of justice. . . .  
Supervisory powers are exercised to direct trial courts to 
adopt judicial procedures that will address matters that are of 
utmost seriousness, not only for the integrity of a particular 
trial but also for the perceived fairness of the judicial system 
as a whole. . . . [The Supreme Court] ordinarily invoke[s] 
[its] supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not 
constitutionally required but that [it believes] is preferable as 
                                                                                                                          
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 24 n.3 (1985) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 
(1973)).  
Note, however, that the supervisory authority of the U.S. Supreme Court pertains only to lower 
courts in the federal system.  The Court has no such authority over state courts except where it may 
involve a question of constitutional interpretation.  See Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504, 508–09 (1958) 
(citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943)) (“Were this a federal prosecution we would 
have little difficulty in dealing with what occurred under our general supervisory power over the 
administration of justice in the federal courts.  But to hold that what happened here violated the 
Constitution of the United States is quite another matter.”).  With respect to proceedings in state courts, 
the Court’s “authority is limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.”  
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991); see also Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438 (quoting the 
aforesaid language from Mu’Min); Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 344–45 (1981) (per curiam) (stating 
that “[f]ederal judges . . . may not require the observance of any special procedures [in state courts] 
except when necessary to assure compliance with the dictates of the Federal Constitution”). 
37 507 U.S. 234 (1993). 
38 Id. at 244. 
39 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (mandating that, during voir dire, the 
state may not excuse a prospective juror via a peremptory challenge based on the prospective juror’s 
race, because doing so would violate the Equal Protection Clause); United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 
176 (1975) (establishing that a defendant’s silence after being given his Miranda rights is not 
admissible as proof of guilt); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 313 (1959) (exercising 
supervisory power to reverse the conviction of a defendant about whom jurors had read newspaper 
articles revealing a past criminal record); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 314–15 (1931) 
(reversing the conviction of an African American based on the trial court’s refusal to permit voir dire 
regarding possible race prejudice of prospective jurors, and ordering that such questioning be 
permitted). 
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a matter of policy.”40   
When the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with a claim that it 
had no authority to review a rule adopted by a district court, it asserted, 
consistent with the result in DeJesus and basing its decision largely on 
English common law antecedents, that it had the right to determine the 
reasonableness of a district court rule, notwithstanding the authority of the 
lower court to adopt its own rules.41  The Florida Supreme Court has 
similarly opined that, although Florida’s inferior courts have the inherent 
power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure, this power “is subject 
to the supervisory control of the [state] Supreme Court . . . .”42 
Furthermore, where a state’s highest court has itself adopted rules, any 
rules adopted by a trial court must be in accord.  To that effect, the Arizona 
Supreme Court has stated that “[a]ny court may exercise its inherent power 
to make and amend rules governing its own local practice.  But such rules 
cannot be inconsistent with the supreme court’s rules . . . .”43 
In sum, while a trial court has the inherent authority to control its 
proceedings, any rules it promulgates in furtherance of this objective are 
subject to review by the state’s highest court, and any such rules are 
subordinate to rules adopted by the state’s high court.   
While the Connecticut Supreme Court traditionally has performed its 
rulemaking function in the course of appellate review,44 other states’ 
                                                                                                                          
40 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 83–84 n.5 (Conn. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. 
Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 318 (Conn. 2005)).  In State v. Valedon, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
observed that “‘[u]nder our supervisory authority, we have adopted rules intended to guide the lower 
courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal process.’”  State v. Valedon, 802 
A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. 2002) (quoting State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 19 (Conn. 1998)).  The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has similarly asserted a supervisory authority.  In In re 
DeSaulnier, the court asserted that it possessed “inherent common law and constitutional powers . . . as 
the highest constitutional court of the Commonwealth, to protect and preserve the integrity of the 
judicial system and to supervise the administration of justice.”  In re DeSaulnier, 274 N.E.2d 454, 456 
(Mass. 1971). 
41 People v. Callopy, 192 N.E. 634, 639 (Ill. 1934). 
42 Petition of Jacksonville Bar Ass’n, 169 So. 674, 675 (Fla. 1936).  
43 Bergeron ex rel. Perez v. O’Neil, 74 P.3d 952, 961–62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
44 Although the Connecticut Supreme Court has historically exercised its supervisory authority in 
the context of adjudication, the court has also exercised its rulemaking powers during certain periods, 
and acted legislatively in approving rules of criminal procedure in 1976.  See generally Lucy Gordon 
Potter, Note, Court Rule-Making in Connecticut Revisited—Three Recent Decisions: State v. King, 
Steadwell v. Warden, and State v. Canady, 16 CONN. L. REV. 121 (1983) (discussing the 
constitutionality of rulemaking in Connecticut).  See also William M. Maltbie, The Rule-Making 
Powers of the Judges, in CONNECTICUT PRACTICE 1, 1–2, 6–7 (William R. Moller ed., 1966) 
(discussing rulemaking by the court since 1806 and the court’s freedom to continue to make rules that 
do not conflict with laws passed by the general assembly).  The Connecticut Supreme Court has 
exercised its supervisory authority in the course of adjudication to establish, prospectively, rules of 
procedure for the trial courts.  See State v. Gore, 955 A.2d 1, 12–13 (Conn. 2008) (requiring the court 
to canvass the defendant directly to ensure that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary when 
confronted with a criminal defendant who seeks to waive the right to a jury trial); DeJesus, 953 A.2d at 
79 (Conn. 2008) (requiring the court to give an appropriate cautionary instruction to the jury when 
admitting evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 318–19 (Conn. 
2005) (requiring the court to give the jury an instruction regarding the risks inherent in certain 
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highest courts promulgate rules through a quasi-legislative process.45  
Through either means, several states’ highest courts have asserted an 
inherent authority to create rules for their jurisdictions’ lower courts.  For 
example, in Miller v. State, the Arkansas Supreme Court observed that, 
regardless of a statute enabling the court to fashion rules, its promulgation 
of rules was consonant with the court’s constitutional control over all trial 
courts.46  In this case, the court rejected the notion that it had no inherent 
rulemaking authority over the lower courts absent an enabling statute.  The 
court asserted that “[t]he enabling act here merely recognizes and is 
harmonious with this court’s inherent powers rather than conferring an 
express power.”47  Similarly, in Indiana, notwithstanding an enabling 
statute, the state’s appellate court held that “[t]he Indiana Supreme Court 
has the inherent power to establish rules governing the course of litigation 
in the trial courts.”48  
In a strong assertion of its inherent power, the Mississippi Supreme 
Court, in spite of legislation enabling its rulemaking function, stated that  
“[t]he inherent power of [the] Court to promulgate procedural rules 
emanates from the fundamental constitutional concept of the separation of 
powers and the vesting of judicial powers in the courts.”49  In Tennessee, 
where legislation gives the Tennessee Supreme Court the power to 
prescribe rules of practice and procedure for all state courts, the court of 
appeals has nevertheless held that “[t]he authority to promulgate rules 
                                                                                                                          
eyewitness identifications); Duperry v. Solnit, 803 A.2d 287, 301–02 (Conn. 2002) (requiring that the 
court canvass the criminal defendant to ensure a plea is voluntary when the defendant pleads not guilty 
by reason of mental disease or defect and the state assents to the plea); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 
448–49 (Conn. 2002) (establishing the burden of proof in third-party visitation cases); Ireland v. 
Ireland, 717 A.2d 676, 679, 682, 684–86, 689 (Conn. 1998) (establishing a burden-shifting scheme and 
factors to be considered in determining the best interests of children in parental-relocation cases); State 
v. Coleman, 700 A.2d 14, 23 (Conn. 1997) (requiring that, upon request, the sentencing court must 
articulate its reasons on the record for imposing a greater sentence after trial than the sentence 
previously imposed under the terms of a plea agreement); State v. Gould, 695 A.2d 1022, 1031 (Conn. 
1997) (requiring that replay of videotaped deposition testimony be shown in open court under the 
supervision of the trial judge and in the presence of the parties and their counsel); State v. Brown, 668 
A.2d 1288, 1303 (Conn. 1995) (directing courts to conduct an inquiry when presented with a claim of 
jury misconduct in a criminal case); State v. Breton, 663 A.2d 1026, 1049 (Conn. 1995) (holding that, 
in a death penalty case, there must be a prefatory statement regarding the jury’s duty in the special 
verdict form); Bennett v. Auto. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 646 A.2d 806, 812 (Conn. 1994) (requiring an 
insurer to raise issues of policy limitation by special defense); State v. Patterson, 645 A.2d 535, 538–
39, 543 (Conn. 1994) (holding that a judge must remain on the bench throughout voir dire in a criminal 
trial); State v. Holloway, 553 A.2d 166, 171–72 (Conn. 1989) (establishing the procedure to be 
followed during jury selection when a party claims that jurors are being excluded for impermissible 
reasons).  But see State v. Madera, 503 A.2d 136, 141–42 (Conn. 1985) (refusing to adopt a procedure 
allowing criminal defendants to enter conditional pleas aside from those permitted by statute). 
45 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.   
46 Miller v. State, 555 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Ark. 1977). 
47 Id. at 564. 
48 Owen Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Ind. Dep’t of Workforce Dev., 861 N.E.2d 1282, 1287 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
49 Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975). 
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which control the practice and procedure of the courts of [the] State is an 
inherent power of the Tennessee Supreme Court.”50  And, in Washington, 
where there is statutory authorization for the supreme court to promulgate 
rules of practice, the supreme court has asserted:  
These courts have operated under that statute for over half a 
century, and furthermore have determined that the court’s 
rulemaking power not only is derived from the statute but is a 
necessary adjunct of the judicial function.  Its inherent power 
to govern court procedures stems from Const. art. 4, § 1, 
vesting the judicial power in the Supreme Court and other 
courts designated in the constitution.51  
This review of decisional law and commentary reflects broad support 
for the notion that courts have the inherent authority to promulgate rules of 
practice and procedure flowing naturally from their existence as courts, 
and that the exercise of this authority is subject to review by the highest 
court in the particular judicial system.52  The proper exercise of this 
authority, however, is not unbounded.   
VI.  THE LIMITS OF A COURT’S INHERENT RULEMAKING POWER 
When a court asserts its rulemaking power as inherent, with or without 
express constitutional or legislative affirmation, it is generally understood 
that the authority to promulgate rules is limited to practice and procedure 
and does not extend to abridge or modify substantive rights.53  
                                                                                                                          
50 Dial v. Harrington, 138 S.W.3d 895, 897 (Tenn Ct. App. 2003) (citing Corum v. Holston 
Health & Rehab. Ctr., 104 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tenn. 2003)). 
51 Seattle v. Hesler, 653 P.2d 631, 635 (Wash. 1982) (citing State v. Fields, 530 P.2d 284 (Wash. 
1975); State v. Smith 527 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1974)).  
52 It is also noteworthy that the assertion of the right of a state’s highest court to formulate rules of 
practice and procedure for lower courts, as seen in these reported cases, appears not to be dependent on 
whether lower courts are creatures of statute or are constitutionally-made.  The right adheres to the 
higher court by reason of its own inherent supervisory powers over lower courts.   
53 In several states where legislatures have enacted legislation regarding the court’s rulemaking 
authority, the enactment contains a limiting clause stating that judicial rules are not to abridge, enlarge, 
or modify the substantive right of any party.  E.g., ALA. CONST. art. VI, § 150; ARK. CONST. amend. 
LXXX, § 3; N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 13(2); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B); PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-109 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-2-108 (2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 51-14(a) (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 161(c) (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-2-18(a) 
(West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-11 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-213 (2010); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 480.051 (West 2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.010 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
2.120(2) (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1(A) (1998); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 
22.004(a) (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1 (2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 751.12(1) (West 2001); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-2-115(b) (2009).  Additionally, in those states in which either the constitution or 
legislation expressly grants the court rulemaking authority over practice and procedure, courts have 
treated their authority as excluding the right to abridge or modify substantive rights.  See, e.g., State v. 
Native Vill. of Nunapitchuk, 156 P.3d 389, 405 (Alaska 2007) (concluding that a procedural rule 
granting courts a wide range of discretion to consider broad equitable factors when awarding attorney’s 
fees must be limited in its application to prevent an application of substantive law); Van Bibber v. 
Hartford Accident & Indem. Ins. Co., 439 So. 2d. 880, 883 (Fla. 1983) (finding that the statute in 
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Just as, in principle, courts may promulgate procedural but not 
substantive rules, state legislatures may enact laws which create or modify 
rights but they may not dictate court practice and procedure.54  But these 
general pronouncements resting on the distinction between procedural and 
substantive law are often not useful in determining whether a particular 
rule or statute has crossed an impermissible boundary.  That is because the 
differences between procedural and substantive law are often not easily 
discernable in the context of an actual case.  One commentator aptly noted: 
“The distinction between substance and procedure is readily definable; 
procedural laws govern court activity, while substantive laws establish 
rights, set duties, and grant relief.  However, this distinction is extremely 
difficult to apply, as substantive rights are often inextricably interwoven 
with procedural regulations.”55  The Washington Supreme Court, while 
recognizing that the line of demarcation between substantive and 
procedural law is not always clear, set forth the classical distinction as 
follows: “Substantive law prescribes norms for societal conduct and 
punishments for violations thereof.  It thus creates, defines, and regulates 
primary rights.  In contrast, practice and procedure pertain to the 
                                                                                                                          
question was substantive and operated in an area of legitimate legislative concern); Quaker Oats Co. v. 
Cedar Rapids Human Rights Comm’n, 268 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 1978) (finding that an 
administrative body cannot use its rulemaking powers to create substantive rights); Paley v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 209 N.W.2d 232, 239–40 (Mich. 1973) (Swainson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that rules of court 
cannot enlarge or restrict jurisdiction, or abrogate or modify substantive law); Op. of the Justices, 688 
A.2d 1006, 1012–13 (N.H. 1997) (observing that a matter of substantive law contained within a 
procedural court rule does not immunize the rule from legislative change); Ferreira v. Rancocas 
Orthopedic Assocs., 836 A.2d 779, 789 (N.J. 2003) (Zazzali, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (citing court precedent establishing that court rules involving procedural rather than substantive 
rights will be upheld over conflicting statutes); State v. Robinson, 972 A.2d 150, 159 (R.I. 2009) 
(finding that a court-made rule expanding the jurisdiction of the district court lies solely within the 
province of the legislature because it concerns substantive legislative matters); Ryan v. Gold Cross 
Servs., Inc., 903 P.2d 423, 425 & n.2 (Utah 1995) (finding that a court rule of evidence regarding 
seatbelt use contains operative provisions that announce a substantive principle and is therefore subject 
to legislative alteration); Sackett v. Santilli, 47 P.3d 948, 951 (Wash. 2002) (citing court precedent that 
Washington constitutional authority allows courts to create rules for limited purposes of uniformity and 
not for the purpose of making broad and general rules). 
54 The Connecticut Supreme Court has asserted that, “[j]ust as the general assembly lacks the 
power to enact rules governing procedure that is exclusively within the power of the courts . . . so do 
the courts lack the power to promulgate rules governing substantive rights and remedies.”  In re 
Samantha C., 847 A.2d 883, 900 (Conn. 2004) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)  
In a similar vein, the Kentucky Supreme Court has stated:  
Just as it would be a violation of separation of powers for this Court to exercise 
power properly belonging to another branch, e.g., adopting substantive law under 
the guise of enacting a procedural rule since the enactment of substantive law is the 
exclusive prerogative of the Legislature under our Constitution, a similar 
constitutional violation of separation of powers occurs when the Legislature 
promulgates rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice or rules 
governing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.   
Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Cheyenne Res., Inc., 163 S.W.3d 408, 423 (Ky. 2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
55 Joanna C. New, Note, The Bounds of Power: Judicial Rule-Making in Illinois, 10 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 100, 105 (1978) (internal citations omitted). 
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essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which substantive law, 
rights, and remedies are effectuated.”56  
The U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis of claims involving the Rules 
Enabling Act demonstrates the futility of relying on the theoretical 
distinction between procedural and substantive law when assessing 
whether legislation impermissibly encroaches on the judicial function or a 
judicially-fashioned rule invades the province of the legislature.  The Rules 
Enabling Act authorizes the Court to adopt rules of practice and procedure 
for federal circuit and district courts with the limitation that such rules 
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”57    
 Faced with claims that court-made rules have affected litigants’ 
substantive rights, the Court’s decisions reflect the difficulty of pinpointing 
with any precision the dividing line between substance and procedure.  In 
confronting claims regarding the Rules Enabling Act, the Court has 
demonstrated a practical approach to assessing whether judicial rulemaking 
or legislative enactment runs afoul of separation of powers precepts.58  
While these cases do not concern inherent authority or deal with evidence 
law-making, their reasoning is instructive, by analogy, to our present 
inquiry regarding a court’s adoption of a code of evidence pursuant to its 
rulemaking authority regarding practice and procedure.  
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,59 the Supreme Court clarified that 
there is no federal common law and therefore, in diversity actions, federal 
courts are obligated to follow the substantive law of the applicable state.60  
While Erie established the principle regarding the application of a state’s 
substantive law, however, it did not provide an analytical framework for 
distinguishing substantive from procedural law, an issue that arises when 
litigants claim a conflict between a state law and a federal rule.  Three 
years after Erie, in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., the Court was 
confronted with the issue of whether Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requiring a litigant in certain kinds of litigation to submit to a 
physical or mental examination, had the effect of abridging, enlarging, or 
modifying a litigant’s substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling 
Act.61  There, the Court found that the rule in question did not 
impermissibly affect a substantive right even though its requirement that a 
                                                                                                                          
56 State v. Smith, 527 P.2d 674, 677 (Wash. 1974) (citations omitted).  For the same formulation, 
see Town of Middlebury v. Dep’t. of Envtl. Prot., 927 A.2d 793, 810 (Conn. 2007).  One writer put it 
more simply, stating that a substantive law can be seen as one that defines a right, while a procedural 
law establishes the means for its enforcement.  Eli J. Warach, Note, The Rule-Making Power: Subject 
to Law?, 5 RUTGERS L. REV. 376, 382–83 (1950). 
57 Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
58 See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text. 
59 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
60 Id. at 78.  
61 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 6, 9–10 (1941). 
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litigant submit to an examination involved a substantial right.62  In 
fashioning a facially straightforward approach to determining whether a 
court rule could withstand a separation of powers challenge, the Sibbach 
Court stated: “The test must be whether a rule really regulates 
procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized 
by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for 
disregard or infraction of them.”63 
In dissent, Justice Frankfurter alluded to the difficulty in distinguishing 
procedure from substance.  He commented: 
Speaking with diffidence in support of a view which has 
not commended itself to the Court, it does not seem to me 
that the answer to our question is to be found by an analytic 
determination whether the power of examination here 
claimed is a matter of procedure or a matter of substance, 
even assuming that the two are mutually exclusive categories 
with easily ascertainable contents.64  
Following the reasoning of Sibbach, the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree65 rejected a challenge to Rule 
4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding service of process, 
with this statement:  
Undoubtedly most alterations of the rules of practice and 
procedure may and often do affect the rights of litigants.  
Congress’ prohibition of any alteration of substantive 
rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such 
incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the 
prescribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of 
litigants who, agreeably to rules of practice and procedure, 
have been brought before a court authorized to determine 
their rights.  The fact that the application of Rule 4(f) will 
operate to subject petitioner’s rights to adjudication by the 
district court for northern Mississippi will undoubtedly 
affect those rights.  But it does not operate to abridge, 
enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court 
will adjudicate its rights.  It relates merely to the manner 
and the means by which a right to recover . . . is enforced.  
In this sense the rule is a rule of procedure and not of 
                                                                                                                          
62 Id. at 16 (holding that the “rules under attack are within the authority granted”). 
63 Id. at 14. 
64 Id. at 17 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
65 Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1946) (internal citations omitted).  
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substantive right, and is not subject to the prohibition of 
the Enabling Act.66 
As can be seen from these cases, although the basic tenet of Erie is that 
in a diversity action the court must apply substantive state law and federal 
procedural rules, Erie does not provide a clear analytical pathway for 
assessing whether a particular rule under scrutiny impermissibly crosses 
the line between the procedural and substantive law.67  It does appear, 
however, that the application of a federal rule in a diversity action will not 
be held to violate the proscription of the Rules Enabling Act merely 
because of its incidental effects on a litigant’s substantive rights where the 
rule is reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of the federal practice 
and procedure system, and where the rule’s impact on one’s substantive 
rights is merely incidental.68 
This brief reference to the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of 
separation of powers issues related to the Rules Enabling Act again 
illustrates the futility of attempting to distinguish between substance and 
procedure in assessing the viability of rules.  The teaching of these federal 
cases is that the reference to the classic distinction between substantive and 
procedural law is often of little aid in determining whether a court rule 
impermissibly encroaches upon the law-making function of the legislature 
and, reciprocally, whether a legislative enactment invades the sole 
province of the judiciary.  Rather than relying on this distinction, courts 
assessing judicially-made rules have focused on whether the thrust of a 
rule under scrutiny is to affect court practice and procedure; if so, courts 
have been unwilling to find unconstitutional a rule of practice or procedure 
merely because it may have an impact on a litigant’s substantive rights.69  
                                                                                                                          
66 Id. at 445–46 (1946) (internal citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
67 For a discussion of the progeny of Erie and continuation of the debate regarding application of 
the federal rules in diversity cases, see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471–74 (1965). 
68 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1991). 
69 Consistent with the unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 
(1941), to confine its analysis of a court rule under separation of powers attack to parsing the difference 
between substantive and procedural law, some state courts have similarly expressed the futility of 
relying on that dichotomy in assessing the propriety of rules under scrutiny.  For example, in Busik v. 
Levine, 307 A.2d 571 (N.J. 1973), the New Jersey Supreme Court, in rejecting an argument that a 
court-fashioned rule providing for prejudgment interest in tort actions was unconstitutional because it 
affected substantive rights, observed that “it is simplistic to assume that all law is divided neatly 
between substance and procedure.”  Id. at 578.  Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opined, in 
response to a claim that its prejudgment interest rule was unconstitutional because it affected 
substantive rights:   
Undeniably, Rule 238 embodies both procedural and substantive elements.  Its 
purpose and effect are procedural, yet its performance will touch upon substantive 
rights of both parties.  However, the fact that a rule does involve the substantive 
rights of litigants should not mean that the rule is an inappropriate topic for Supreme 
Court rule-making.  Most rules of procedure will eventually reverberate to the 
substantive rights and duties of those involved.   
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This approach is in accord with the tack the Connecticut Supreme 
Court took in assessing a statute under attack as an impermissible 
legislative assumption of the judicial rulemaking role.  In Heslin v. 
Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo,70 the court stated: 
In the context of challenges to statutes whose constitutional 
infirmity is claimed to flow from impermissible intrusion 
upon the judicial power, we have refused to find 
constitutional impropriety in a statute simply because it 
affects the judicial function, so long as it is an exercise of 
power assigned by the constitution to the legislature.  In 
many situations, executive, legislative and judicial powers 
necessarily overlap.  In such situations, a statute is not 
unconstitutional unless it represents an effort by the 
legislature to exercise a power which lies exclusively under 
the control of the courts . . . or if it establishes a significant 
interference with the orderly conduct of the Superior Court’s 
judicial functions.71   
The teaching of cases involving claims that legislation impermissibly 
encroaches upon a judicial function or that judge-made rules improperly 
affect substantive rights is that reference to generalities regarding 
substantive and procedural law does not aid the analysis.  Rather, some 
courts have utilized a purpose-driven analysis.  That is, in determining the 
constitutionality of such rulemaking or legislation, some courts have 
                                                                                                                          
Lauderberger v. Port Auth., 436 A.2d 147, 155 (Pa. 1981).  In rejecting the dichotomy between 
substance and procedure as the correct analytical path, the Lauderberger court adopted, instead, a 
purposive approach to assess the viability of the rule under scrutiny.  The court commented:   
The tacit assumption that the precise point at which the line between the two is to 
be drawn is the same for all purposes . . . is of course connected with the other 
assumptions . . . namely, that the ‘line’ is to be ‘discovered’ rather than ‘drawn’ and 
that it can be located without keeping in mind the purpose of the classification.  If 
once we recognize that the ‘line’ can be drawn only in the light of the purpose in 
view, it cannot be assumed without discussion that as our purposes change the line 
can be drawn at precisely the same point.  We must therefore seek to determine the 
purpose of the rule in order to properly characterize its nature.  
Id. at 150 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citation omitted).  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, when faced with a claim that the dismissal of a suit on the basis 
of a court-fashioned rule requiring the filing of law suits within a certain time period affected a party’s 
substantive rights observed:  
In this case, the application of the rule has a collateral effect of giving the 
defendant a defense of barring the cause of action.  However, this does not make the 
rule one of substantive law.  And, this is true although it has been said in this state 
that the statute of limitations extinguishes the right or cause of action as well as 
creating a defense or defensive remedy.  Most procedural rules may have some 
collateral substantive effect but do not become substantive in nature because of such 
indirect effect. 
Fehrenbach v. Fehrenbach, 167 N.W.2d 218, 220–21 (Wis. 1986).  
70 Heslin v. Conn. Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938 (Conn. 1983). 
71 Id. at 944 (internal citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). 
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looked to the purpose of a rule or statute to determine whether its aim is to 
create a right or to carve a procedure for the enforcement of a right.  Such 
an approach appears in opinions assessing whether evidence rulemaking 
belongs solely to the judiciary, to the legislature, or to both branches as a 
shared responsibility, because evidence laws often contain features that 
implicate both judicial procedure and public policy.  
VII.  THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVIDENCE LAW 
Just as in a separation of powers assessment of a federal rule of 
procedure, the determination of whether a judicially-made evidentiary rule 
or a legislative enactment of evidence law crosses an impermissible 
boundary is not likely to be aided by labeling the act or rule as procedural 
or substantive.  Nor is the question of whether evidence rulemaking 
belongs to the judiciary answered solely by reference to the fact that the 
U.S. Supreme Court and several state supreme courts have asserted the 
authority to promulgate rules of evidence for lower courts in their 
supervisory capacity.72  And, while it is significant to this discussion that 
many states’ supreme courts have adopted rules of evidence in a legislative 
manner pursuant to their authority to promulgate practice and procedure 
rules, that phenomenon does not alone lead inescapably to a broad 
conclusion that the making of evidence law belongs exclusively to the 
judiciary,73 nor does the fact that some courts have stated that evidence law 
                                                                                                                          
72 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (“In the exercise of its supervisory 
authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts . . . this Court has, from the 
very beginning of its history, formulated rules of evidence to be applied in federal criminal 
prosecutions. . . . And in formulating such rules of evidence for federal criminal trials the Court has 
been guided by considerations of justice not limited to the strict canons of evidentiary relevance.” 
(internal citations omitted)).  Numerous state supreme courts have established evidentiary rules for 
lower courts.  See, e.g., State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 49 (Conn. 2008) (carving out an exception to the 
state’s code of evidence rule regarding the admission of prior misconduct in certain cases); State v. 
Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 317–18 (Conn. 2005) (“‘Appellate courts possess an inherent supervisory 
authority over the administration of justice . . . .  Under our supervisory authority, we have adopted 
rules intended to guide the lower courts in the administration of justice in all aspects of the criminal 
process.’” (quoting State v. Valedon, 802 A.2d 836, 839 (Conn. 2002))); State v. McGlew, 658 A.2d 
1191, 1196 (N.H. 1995) (guiding the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence under a specific 
rule of evidence); Van Tran v. State, 6 S.W.3d 257, 260 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that the rules of 
evidence should not be applied to limit the admissibility of reliable evidence bearing on a prisoner’s 
competency); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 965 (Utah 1989) (adopting, pursuant to the court’s 
supervisory authority, a bifurcated hearing process in sexual abuse cases); In re Jerrell C.J., 699 
N.W.2d 110, 123 (Wis. 2005) (adopting a rule regarding juvenile confessions). 
73 In the following states, the highest courts have adopted rules of evidence pursuant to their 
authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure: Alabama (ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.11; 
ALA. CODE § 12-2-7 (2005); ALA. R. EVID.); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art. 6, § 5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 12-109 (2003);  ARIZ. R. EVID.); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. OF 1874, amend. 80, § 3; ARK. CODE ANN. § 
16-11-301 (2010); ARK. UNIF. R. EVID.); Delaware (DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1); 10 DEL. CODE ANN. 
§ 161(a) (1999); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID.); Idaho (IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1-212 (2010); IDAHO R. EVID); 
Indiana (IND. CODE § 34-8-1-3 (2008); IND. R. EVID.); Kansas (KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-101, 20-342 
(2007); KAN. R. EVID.); Maryland (MD. CONST. art. IV, Pt. II, § 18(a); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. § 1-201 (2003); MD. R. EVID.); Michigan (MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 5; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 
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is procedural.74   
Notwithstanding the judiciary’s authority regarding evidence, there 
remain areas of evidence law that embody significant public policy.  Thus, 
the promulgation of codes in several states should not be seen as a 
determination by those states that all evidence law belongs in the exclusive 
domain of the judiciary.  And, even though many courts have asserted the 
right to promulgate codes of evidence pursuant to an inherent practice and 
procedure rulemaking authority, the fact that evidence law spans 
substantive and procedural law is sufficient reason to warrant inter-branch 
cooperation in the promulgation of a code by the judiciary as well as 
                                                                                                                          
600.223 (2001); MICH. R. EVID); Montana (MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2; MONT. CODE ANN. § 3-1-112 
(2010); MONT. R. EVID.); New Hampshire (N.H. CONST. art. 73-a; N.H. R. EVID.); New Mexico (N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 38-1-1 (1998); N.M. R. EVID.); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; N.D. R. EVID.); 
Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B); OHIO. R. EVID); Pennsylvania (PA. CONST. art. V, § 10(c); PA. R. 
EVID.); Rhode Island (R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-6-2(a) (1997); R.I. R. EVID.); South Carolina (S.C. CONST. 
art. V, § 4; S.C. R. EVID.); South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. V, § 12; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-3-2 
(2004); S.D. R. EVID.); Washington (WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 24; WASH. REV. CODE § 2.04.180 (2010); 
WASH. R. EVID.); West Virginia (W.VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; W.VA. CODE § 51-1-4 (2008); W.VA. R. 
EVID.); and Wyoming (WYO.STAT. ANN. § 5-2-114 (2009); WYO. R. EVID.).  This phenomenon 
suggests, at least, a perception by these courts that evidentiary law is sufficiently procedural to fall 
within the judicial ambit.  And by implication, these courts have determined that the promulgation of 
evidence law by rule does not impermissibly cross the divide between the proper function of the court 
and the exclusive realm of the legislature.  Certainly, the adoption in Connecticut of a code of evidence 
in 2000 by the judges of the superior court pursuant to their inherent rulemaking authority reflects the 
collective belief of the judges that such action does not transgress the boundaries of appropriate judicial 
action.  In Colorado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, there is legislation 
authorizing the supreme court to adopt rules of evidence.  See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-128 (2010); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 9-A (2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 480.0591 (2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-
3-61 (2002); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.109 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3(A) (2007).  In Utah, 
there is a constitutional provision directing the supreme court to make rules of evidence.  See UTAH 
CONST. art. VIII, § 4.  In Florida, where the legislature has adopted an evidence code, the Florida 
Supreme Court has adopted it as well to the extent it is procedural in order to avoid a constitutional 
confrontation.  See FLA. STAT. § 25.371 (2010).  It appears that the Florida Supreme Court adopted 
evidence rules as procedural pursuant to its authority over procedure in the courts.  See FLA. CONST. 
art. V., § 2(a).  Some state legislatures have adopted rules of evidence.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-1-1 et 
seq. (1863); HAW. REV. STAT., ch. 626 (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-401 (1964); La. Acts 1988, No. 
515, § 1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-101 et seq. (1975); 1971 Nev. Stat., 775; 1983 N.C. Sess. 
Laws 666; OKLA. STAT. § 12-2101 (1978); CAL. EVID. CODE (stating, in the introduction, that the 
Evidence Code was enacted by Chapter 299 of the Statutes of 1965)); OR. EVID. CODE (1981). 
74 Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated its belief that the law of evidence is 
procedural.  In State v. Lorain, which dealt with the question of whether the admissibility of a 
defendant’s statement should be governed by the lex loci or the lex fori, the court concluded that it 
would be the latter on the basis that “it is the rule that the admissibility of evidence relates to judicial 
procedure and is determined by the law of the forum.”  109 A.2d 504, 507 (Conn. 1954).  More 
broadly, the Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he rules of evidence are procedural.”  State 
v. Almeda, 560 A.2d 389, 395 (Conn. 1989).  This dicta would be a thin reed upon which to rest the 
right of the court to promulgate a code of evidence.  That evidence is essentially procedural is also 
apparently the view of the drafters of the Restatement of Conflicts of Law, which sets forth the rule that 
in matters of conflict, where the substantive law of the lex loci and the procedural law of the lex fori 
control, the admissibility of proffered evidence is controlled by the latter.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 584 & cmt. b, 585 & cmt. a (1934).  More to the point, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has succinctly stated: “[O]ur separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity 
as ‘substantive’ as opposed to ‘procedural.’”  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 606 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)).  
 288 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:265 
recognition, by the judiciary, of the legislature’s historic role in the 
enactment of evidence law as an expression of public policy.  
The overlay between substantive rights and procedure in evidence law 
is aptly illustrated by reference to rape shield statutes, which many state 
legislatures have enacted.  While these statutes generally provide for the 
exclusion of evidence of a sexual complainant’s prior sexual activity,75 
and, therefore, deal arguably with court procedure, they also reflect a 
public policy in favor of protecting the privacy of sexual assault victims 
and encouraging them to come forward.76  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
noted that Michigan’s rape shield statute “represents a valid legislative 
determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against 
surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.”77 
Similarly, a number of states have found that their rape shield statutes 
do not violate the separation of powers doctrine even though the statutes 
purport to determine the inadmissibility of certain evidence in the trial 
process.78  While not in the context of a separation of powers claim, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court has noted the public policy purposes of the 
state’s rape shield statute: 
“Our legislature has determined that, except in specific 
instances, and taking the defendant’s constitutional rights into 
account, evidence of prior sexual conduct is to be excluded 
for policy purposes.  Some of these policies include 
protecting the victim’s sexual privacy and shielding her from 
undue harassment, encouraging reports of sexual assault, and 
enabling the victim to testify in court with less fear of 
embarrassment. . . . Other policies promoted by the law 
include avoiding prejudice to the victim, jury confusion and 
                                                                                                                          
75 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-42-101; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f; FLA. STAT. § 794.022. 
76 See infra note 82.  
77 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991). 
78 See, e.g., State v. Gilfillan, 998 P.2d 1069, 1077 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (finding that Arizona’s 
Rape Shield Law “neither impermissibly infringes upon the Arizona Supreme Court’s rulemaking 
authority nor violates the doctrine of the separation of powers”); People v. McKenna, 585 P.2d 275, 
279 (Colo. 1978) (holding that a state rape shield statute was not an unconstitutional legislative attempt 
to create a rule of procedure for the judiciary); State v. Mitchell, 424 N.W.2d 698, 706 (Wis. 1988) 
(upholding the state’s rape shield statute against a separation of powers attack).  But, courts have not 
been uniform in their approaches to separation of powers claims regarding particular facets of 
evidentiary law.  For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court found that rules of privilege are 
procedural on the basis that they relate to the obligation of everyone to give testimony or furnish 
evidence in court.  The court opined:   
[R]ules of evidence are procedural, in that they are a part of the judicial machinery 
administered by the courts for determining the facts upon which the substantive 
rights of the litigant rest and are resolved.  Rules of evidence do no more than 
regulate the method of proceeding by which substantive rights and duties are 
determined.   
Ammerman v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1357 (N.M. 1976).  One could fairly argue that a 
purposive analysis might have led the court to a dissimilar result.   
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waste of time on collateral matters.”79   
Recognizing the futility of attempting to categorize all evidence law as 
either substantive or procedural, various courts and commentators have 
devised alternate tests when confronting separation of powers issues.  The 
Michigan Supreme Court fashioned a practical approach, concluding that a 
statutory rule of evidence violates the state constitution’s separation of 
powers clause only when “‘no clear legislative policy reflecting 
considerations other than judicial dispatch of litigation can be  
identified. . . .’”80  The court concluded: 
“[I]f a particular court rule contravenes a legislatively 
declared principle of public policy, having as its basis 
something other than court administration . . . the [court] rule 
should yield.”  We agree with Professor Joiner that [m]ost 
rules of evidence have been made by courts.  Now and then 
the legislature has, as a result of policy consideration over 
and beyond matters involving the orderly dispatch of judicial 
business, enacted rules of evidence.  The distinction 
previously pointed out between policy considerations 
involving the orderly dispatch of judicial business on the one 
hand and policy considerations involving something more 
than that on the other hand is the distinction that must be 
carried through into the evidence field.81   
In 1956, Professors Charles Joiner and Oscar Miller proposed a test to 
assess the appropriateness of adoption of rules of evidence by the court.  
Rejecting the substance-procedure distinction as unworkable because 
“what may be considered procedural for one purpose may be considered 
substantive for another,” they embraced the earlier suggestion that when 
confronting a proposed rule, an assessment should be made: whether a 
given rule of evidence is a device with which to promote the adequate, 
simple, prompt, and inexpensive administration of justice in the conduct of 
a trial or whether the rule, having nothing to do with procedure, is 
                                                                                                                          
79 State v. Cecil J., 970 A.2d 710, 717 (Conn. 2009) (quoting State v. Christiano, 637 A.2d 382, 
389 (Conn. 1994)).  Another example is Connecticut’s version of the dead man statute.  Although it 
represents an exception to the hearsay rule, typically within the domain of procedure, one court has 
found that it exists “to remove the disparity in advantage previously possessed by living litigants as 
against the representatives of persons whose voices were stilled by death, by permitting the declarations 
and memoranda of the latter to be received and weighed in the evidential balance as against the 
assertions of the living.”  Doyle v. Reeves, 152 A. 882, 884 (Conn. 1931).  Thus, the dead man statute 
reflects a public interest beyond an orderly judicial process. 
80 McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 156 (Mich. 1999) (quoting Kirby v. Larson, 256 
N.W.2d 400, 406 (Mich. 1977)).  
81 Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Charles W. Joiner & Oscar J. Miller, 
Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 650–51 
(1957)).   
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grounded upon a declaration of general public policy.82   
Another approach has been referred to as the “primary effects” test, 
which requires an examination of the primary and incidental effects of a 
rule.  If the rule “primarily regulates the truth-seeking function of the court, 
but only incidentally affects a legislative concern, then it is subject to 
judicial regulation.”83  On the other hand, if the primary effect of the rule 
“is the promotion of extrajudicial policies,” and if the rule “has only 
incidental effects on the truth-seeking function of the courts, then [it] can 
only be prescribed by the legislature.”84 
The common theme of these pragmatic approaches is the recognition 
of the overlap between substance and procedure in the law of evidence.  
These analyses reflect the reasonable conclusion that, while courts may 
adopt rules of evidence as procedure, legislatures likewise have a role to 
play in the development of evidentiary laws that may affect judicial 
procedure, if the primary purpose of these laws is to give effect to public 
policy and not merely to control the flow of judicial business.   
In 2006, the Connecticut Supreme Court, in State v. Sawyer, did not 
decide whether the adoption of a code of evidence by the judges of the 
Connecticut Superior Court in 2000 had effectively ousted the supreme 
court from its common law evidence law-making function.85  As to this 
issue, the court commented: 
[W]e acknowledge that, since 2000, the year in which the 
Connecticut Code of Evidence was adopted, the authority to 
change the rules of evidence lies with the judges of the 
Superior Court in the discharge of their rule-making function.  
                                                                                                                          
82 Joiner & Miller, supra note 81 at 635.  The authors further commented:  
[W]hile it is clear that inherent rule-making power is possessed by the courts, the 
scope of the power cannot be defined until we ascertain the purpose for which a rule 
is promulgated and the fullness of its impact.  If the purpose of its promulgation is to 
permit a court to function and function efficiently, the rule-making power is inherent 
unless its impact is such as to conflict with other validly enacted legislative or 
constitutional policy involving matters other than the orderly dispatch of judicial 
business. 
Id.  As we have seen, although rape shield statutes purport to limit the scope of cross examination in 
certain cases, they serve important public policy purposes regarding privacy and the willingness of 
sexual assault victims to come forward.  The statutory laws of privilege reflect public concern for the 
importance of confidentiality in certain relationships even though they include provisions aimed at 
protecting the confidentiality during judicial proceedings.  In whatever state statutory form, the parol 
evidence rule and the statute of frauds, both bearing on permissible evidence, are rooted in notions 
driven by public policy concerns. 
83 Terry A. Moore, Does the Alabama Supreme Court Have the Power To Make Rules of 
Evidence?, 25 CUMB. L. REV. 331, 347–48 (1995). 
84 Id. at 348; see also Thomas Fitzgerald Green, Jr., To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-
Making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482, 484 (1940) (concluding that courts will 
exercise their rulemaking power if the subject at hand is a method “by which rights and duties are to be 
protected and enforced,” but that they will make policy evaluations “if [the] character [of the subject] is 
doubtful”). 
85 State v. Sawyer, 904 A.2d 101, 104 n.1. (Conn. 2006). 
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Of course, prior to that date, changes to substantive 
evidentiary rules were accomplished by our courts in the 
exercise of their common-law authority.  To the extent that 
our evidentiary rules may be deemed to implicate substantive 
rights, we believe that it is unclear whether those rules 
properly are the subject of judicial rule making rather than 
the subject of common-law adjudication.  Because that 
question raises an issue on which we did not request briefing 
by the parties, however, we leave it for another day.86   
Two years later, in State v. DeJesus, the court stated that, to the extent 
it had indicated in Sawyer that the authority to alter the rules of evidence 
resided with the Connecticut Superior Court, and not the state’s appellate 
court “‘in the exercise of their common-law [adjudicative] authority,’” that 
determination was no longer good law.87 
While DeJesus answered the question whether the supreme court 
continues to have the common law authority to develop the law of 
evidence in its adjudicative mode, the supreme court has not addressed 
whether it has the authority to adopt a code of evidence in a legislative 
manner as the judges of the superior court did in 2000.  The court’s 
reticence in this regard may be due, in part, to Connecticut’s history of 
rulemaking by the superior court and the absence of such a tradition on the 
supreme court.88  Neither factor should, however, prevent the court 
                                                                                                                          
86 Id. 
87 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 68 n.23 (Conn. 2008) (alteration in DeJesus) (quoting State v. 
Sawyer, 904 A.2d 101, 104 n.1 (Conn. 2006)).  
88 As noted, the Connecticut Supreme Court has asserted the inherent authority of the judges of 
the superior court to adopt rules of practice and procedure, Appeal of Dattilo, 72 A.2d 50, 53 (Conn. 
1950), and the corresponding inability of the General Assembly to enact procedural legislation.  See 
also State v. Clemente, 353 A.2d 723, 731 (Conn. 1974) (holding unconstitutional a statute which 
required the court to order disclosure of a witness’s prior statements at the close of the witness’s 
testimony).  Clemente has been criticized for the court’s assertion of an exclusive inherent rulemaking 
authority in light of Connecticut’s history of significant legislative involvement in this regard.  See 
Kay, supra note 34, at 22–23.  But, Connecticut’s history of legislative hegemony in this area during 
the nineteenth century and the later assertiveness of the judiciary is not unique.  As noted by Professor 
Kay, the transition in Connecticut from substantial legislative involvement to judicial primacy in 
rulemaking was a reflection of developments throughout the nation during the same span of time.  Id. at 
27–28.  In the early part of the twentieth century, Deans Roscoe Pound and John H. Wigmore led a 
movement to establish the judiciary, rather than the legislative branch, as the proper source of 
rulemaking.  See Roscoe Pound, The Rulemaking Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A. J. 599, 603 (1926) 
(arguing against legislative pronouncement of procedural rules and in favor of judicial freedom to 
prescribe rules); John H. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void 
Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276, 276 (1929) (“[T]he legislature . . . exceeds its constitutional 
power when it attempts to impose upon the judiciary any rules for the dispatch of the judiciary’s duties; 
and . . . therefore all legislatively declared rules for procedure, civil or criminal, in the courts, are void, 
except such as are expressly stated in the Constitution.” (emphasis removed)).  While Professor Kay 
was critical of the Clemente court’s view of Connecticut’s history regarding rulemaking, it is 
significant looking forward that, although the court has, since Clemente, continued to affirm the 
proposition that rulemaking belongs to the judiciary, it has also found facially procedural statutes 
constitutional on the basis that they represent an acceptable overlap in responsibility for the same 
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presently from adopting a code of evidence, as many other state supreme 
courts have done.89   
The adoption of codes of evidence by several state supreme courts and 
the Connecticut Superior Court in a legislative manner should also put to 
rest any concerns of whether the Connecticut Supreme Court may adopt a 
code in this manner.  In adopting codes of evidence, supreme courts of 
other states decided, by necessary implication, that the development of 
evidence law, at least to large extent, is a proper activity for the judiciary, 
and that evidence law could be promulgated as rules in a legislative-style 
process and not only through adjudication. 
VIII.  COURTS ACTING IN A LEGISLATIVE MANNER 
While deciding cases is the core function of the judiciary, judicial 
activity also includes rulemaking and judicial administration.90  As we 
                                                                                                                          
subject area.  For instance, in a case dealing with statutes relating to the transfer of certain cases from 
the juvenile docket to the regular docket of the superior court, the appellate court stated:  
In the present case, the respondent challenges the constitutionality of §§ 46b-127 
and 54-46a (b) because their provisions require the trial court to deny any motion for 
discovery in connection with a transfer hearing, except motions to discover 
exculpatory information.  These statutory provisions do not control or limit the 
judiciary’s discretion in discovery matters to the same extent as the statute in 
Clemente because they apply only to a preliminary stage of the proceedings and 
have been held constitutional. 
In re Jonathan M., 700 A.2d 1370, 1376 (Conn. App. 1997), cert. denied, 701 A.2d. 661 (Conn. 1997); 
see also Bartholomew v. Schweizer, 587 A.2d 1014, 1018 (Conn. 1991) (declining to find a statute 
regarding closing argument during trial unconstitutional even though it bore directly on the trial 
process).  The court commented:  
In the context of challenges to statutes whose constitutional infirmity is claimed to 
flow from impermissible intrusion upon the judicial power, we have refused to find 
constitutional impropriety in a statute simply because it affects the judicial  
function. . . .  A statute violates the constitutional mandate for a separate judicial 
magistracy only if it represents an effort by the legislature to exercise a power which 
lies exclusively under the control of the courts . . . or if it establishes a significant 
interference with the orderly conduct of the Superior Court’s judicial functions. 
Id. at 1017 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In an even more deferential 
expression of the same principle, the supreme court a year later, in Bleau v. Ward, when dealing with 
the statute regarding the right of counsel in a civil action seeking a specific amount of damages from 
the jury, observed that “[i]t is only when compliance with § 52-216b would require a trial court to 
disregard its constitutional obligation to guarantee a fair trial to the litigants that the statutory mandate 
may be deemed to be superseded by that higher law.”  603 A.2d 1147, 1150 (Conn. 1992). 
89 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  Indeed, if a higher court’s authority to adopt rules 
for lower courts flows from the organic nature of the court itself, the fact that Connecticut’s supreme 
court has not traditionally adopted rules in a legislative manner may be a reflection on tradition but not 
on the court’s essential authority. 
90 In O’Coin’s, Inc. v. Treasurer of the County of Worcester, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court stated: “[I]mplicit in the constitutional grant of judicial power is ‘authority necessary to the 
exercise of . . . [that] power’. . . . [That] authority is not limited to adjudication, but includes certain 
ancillary functions, such as rule-making and judicial administration, which are essential if the courts 
are to carry out their constitutional mandate.”  287 N.E.2d 608, 611 (Mass. 1972) (quoting Op. of the 
Justices, 180 N.E. 725, 727 (Mass. 1932)).  Citing O’Coin’s with approval, the Washington Supreme 
Court observed:  
[T]he judicial function extends beyond the determination of questions in controversy 
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have seen, nearly all the states’ highest courts have adopted rules of 
practice and procedure for trial courts, including the rules of evidence, 
through a legislative-type rulemaking process.91  And, because courts act 
legislatively when adopting rules, this activity does not run afoul of the 
prohibition against courts rendering advisory opinions in their adjudicatory 
role.92  Support for this conclusion can be found in the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s adoption of rules of practice and procedure for appeals on its 
docket in spite of its traditionally rigid adherence to the case and 
controversy limitation set forth in Article III of the Constitution.93  These 
rules could not properly be promulgated by the Court if it believed that the 
constitutional case and controversy limitation precluded it from 
promulgating rules in a legislative manner untethered to a pending appeal.  
There is, however, a corollary to the proposition that the promulgation 
of rules by a court acting in a legislative capacity does not violate the case 
and controversy limitation or analogous state limitations on rendering 
                                                                                                                          
and includes functions necessary or incidental to the adjudicative role.  A court’s 
authority “is not limited to adjudication, but includes certain ancillary functions, 
such as and judicial administration, which are essential if the courts are to carry out 
their constitutional mandate.”  This overlapping of functions allows for the scheme 
of checks and balances which . . . evolved side-by-side with and in response to the 
separation of powers concept.   
In re Salary of Juvenile Dir., 552 P.2d 163, 169 (Wash. 1976) (internal citations omitted).  Also 
explicitly agreeing with O’Coin’s, the Mississippi Supreme Court commented that its inherent power to 
ensure the fair administration of justice may be invoked “through the adjudication of cases, the 
promulgation of rules, or the development of internal management practices.”  Tighe v. Crosthwait, 
665 So. 2d 1341, 1347 (Miss. 1995).  For an examination of the sources of rulemaking authority in 
Mississippi and how other states have dealt with the tension between legislative and judicial 
rulemaking powers, see generally F. Keith Ball, Comment, The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme 
Court’s Rule-Making Authority, 60 MISS. L.J. 359 (1990). 
91 See supra notes 34 and 73 and accompanying text. 
92 It should be noted that the Case and Controversy Clause in Article III of the U.S. Constitution 
pertains to the court’s decisional function and operates as a limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction by 
federal courts and not state courts.  Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).  Also, in 
Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted: “We have recognized often that 
the constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound 
by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability . . . .”  490 U.S. 605, 
617 (1989).  For the proposition that the case and controversy limitation is a prohibition against giving 
advisory opinions, see Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 59 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945)), and McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 
167 & n.6 (1950).  In some states, the constitution expressly permits or mandates the issuance of 
advisory opinions in specified circumstances, and where it has arisen, courts have generally been very 
careful not to expand the power or mandate beyond its stated confines.  E.g., Town of Cedar Bluff v. 
Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So. 2d 1253, 1255 (Ala. 2004); Op. of the Justices, 396 A.2d 219, 
223 (Me. 1979); Answer of the Justices to the Governor, 829 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Mass. 2005); 
Chiropractic Council v. Comm’r of the Office of Fin. & Ins. Servs., 716 N.W.2d 561, 577 (Mich. 2006) 
(Markman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748, 752 & n.5 
(R.I. 1997).  Nevertheless, even without a specific constitutional limitation akin to Article III of the 
federal Constitution, many state courts have adopted such a limitation on separation and balance of 
powers principles.  Connecticut follows this path.  See, e.g., Domestic Violence Servs. of Greater New 
Haven v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, 688 A.2d 314, 317 (Conn. 1997) (“We have consistently held that 
we do not render advisory opinions.”).   
93 See generally SUP. CT. R. 13.5, 25.2–25.3, 29.2–29.3, 30.2, 32, 39.2, 44.6 (revised 2003).   
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advisory opinions.  If rulemaking does not involve the determination of a 
party’s rights or responsibilities in the context of a specific dispute, a court 
may not be constrained by the rule when adjudicating an actual 
controversy involving the application of the rule.  While there are not 
many cases in which courts have confronted this question, some courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court, have determined that a rule 
promulgated by the court is not invariably binding on the court when it is 
later confronting an actual case and controversy.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
considered this issue in United States v. Ohio Power Co.94  There, the 
Court was confronted with a petition that was untimely in accordance with 
the requirement of rules it had adopted for the prosecution of appeals.  In a 
closely contested vote, the Court decided to entertain the petition on the 
basis that “finality of litigation must yield where the interests of justice 
would make unfair the strict application of our rules.”95  Justice Harlan, 
joined by Justices Frankfurter and Burton, dissented on prudential grounds 
and not on the basis that the Court’s promulgation of a rule limiting the 
time for bringing such an appeal prevented it from hearing the case.96   
Similar to the Ohio Power majority, the New York State Court of 
Appeals has stated: 
The adoption of the rule in question by the Judges of this 
Court acting in their administrative capacity does not 
preclude them from deciding, in their adjudicatory capacity, a 
subsequent case challenging the validity of the rule.  The 
exercise of the Court’s rule-making power does not carry 
with it a decision that the amended rules are all 
constitutional.  For such a decision would be the equivalent 
of an advisory opinion which . . . we are without 
constitutional power to give.  The fact is that our 
promulgation of the rule is not a prior determination that it is 
valid and constitutional.  That determination must await the 
adjudication in this or a future case.97 
While the New York Court of Appeals case dealt with an 
                                                                                                                          
94 353 U.S. 98 (1957).  
95 Id. at 99.  
96 In dissent, Justice Harlan commented:  
To my way of thinking, it would be preferable to meet this problem by adding to our 
Rules, rather than by making ad hoc exceptions to Rule 58.  The latter course, I fear, 
is bound to lead to the sort of thing that has happened in this case, leaving litigants 
in uncertainty as to when they may safely consider their cases closed in this Court.  
Id. at 104 n.13 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  For other instances in which the Court appears to have 
overridden a rule of its own making in order to accommodate the interests of justice, see Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92–94, 104–06 (1968) and Gondeck v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 382 U.S. 25, 
26–27 (1965). 
97 In re N.Y. State Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. Kaye, 744 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000) 
(internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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administrative order regarding payment of counsel fees in certain types of 
cases, the Supreme Court of Texas faced an analogous situation in a case 
involving the court’s supervision of the bar.  In responding to a claim 
regarding an administrative rule, the court commented: 
Hopefully, this Court does not abandon its collective 
knowledge of the Constitution when it exercises its rule-
making authority, and surely it would not knowingly 
promulgate any rule it regarded as violating the United 
States or Texas Constitutions.  However, we are not 
omniscient.  It is simply beyond the capacity of this or any 
other court to envision every possible constitutional 
ramification or factual application of its orders or rules, 
particularly before it has the benefit of a case and 
controversy that vigorously explores both sides of the 
issues.98 
Although cases dealing with the assessment of administrative rules are 
illuminating for the distinction they draw between the court’s adjudicative 
and administrative functions, their reasoning may not be directly applicable 
to the court’s review of judicially-legislated evidentiary rules because, 
unlike administrative rules that bear on the judicial system, rules of 
evidence relate directly to the trial process.  For that reason, perhaps, 
courts have appeared less likely to ignore or override evidentiary rules in 
the course of deciding cases.  For example, in Maryland, where the state’s 
highest court had adopted rules of evidence through a legislative-type 
process, the court faced a request in a criminal appeal to expand its rule of 
evidence pertaining to uncharged sexual misconduct to permit propensity 
evidence.99  In response, the court commented:  
The plain language of Md. Rule 5-404(b) does not permit 
the admissibility of propensity evidence. . . .  If the Maryland 
Rule is to be “expanded” in its scope, there is an established 
process to be followed.  That is by action of this Court sitting 
in its legislative capacity, not by judicial fiat.100 
                                                                                                                          
98 State Bar of Texas v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 249–50 (Tex. 1994).  To the same effect, see 
Scheehle v. Justices of the Supreme Court, which involved a rule requiring service by attorneys as 
arbitrators.  There, the Supreme Court of Arizona noted: “Our adoption of a rule does not constitute a 
prior determination that the rule is valid and constitutional against any challenge. . . . Such a 
determination awaits a judicial proceeding in which opposing interests are provided a full opportunity 
to be heard.”  Scheehle v. Justices of the Ariz. Supreme Court, 120 P.3d 1092, 1108 (Ariz. 2005). 
99 Hurst v. State, 929 A.2d 157, 160–61 (Md. 2007). 
100 Id. at 168.  The issue on appeal in Hurst regarding uncharged prior misconduct has parallels to 
State v. DeJesus.  One cannot glean from DeJesus whether the court would have been as willing to vary 
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Other states appear to have taken this approach as a matter of prudence 
and deference to the evidence rulemaking process.  For example, in State v. 
Nicholas H.,101 the New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed a conviction 
on the basis that the trial court had admitted hearsay evidence in a juvenile 
transfer hearing in violation of the applicable rule of evidence.102  While 
the court, on review, made no change to the rule under scrutiny, the rule 
was subsequently amended through a legislative-type rulemaking process 
to permit the kind of hearsay disallowed in Nicholas H.103  Showing equal 
deference to its rulemaking process, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
declined the invitation to adopt the Daubert rule regarding the 
admissibility of expert testimony in the context of litigation.104  In State v. 
Hernandez, the court commented: “This Court has a formal process for 
adopting procedural rules after appropriate study and recommendation by 
the Joint Procedure Committee, and we decline Hernandez’s invitation to 
adopt Daubert by judicial decision.”105  
To similar effect, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in refusing to 
adopt a rule—regarding past misconduct—contrary to established common 
law and to its rules of evidence stated:  
Other than demonstrating that our current case law might 
be “wrong,” the State advances no reasons for disregarding 
principles of stare decisis.  With these considerations in 
mind, this case presents a scenario where it is probably 
“better to be consistent than right.”  Any changes in current 
law should come via amendment to the Texas Rules of 
Evidence or by legislative enactment.106  
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, as well, appears to follow this 
prudential route.  In responding to a suggestion that a particular rule be 
changed and applied to the appeal at hand, the court responded: “We have 
traditionally construed our superintending power broadly as authority to 
control litigation in the courts.  Our superintending authority, however, is 
not lightly invoked.  This court ordinarily has refused to modify rules of 
practice or procedure on appeal.”107  
                                                                                                                          
the rule if the rule had been its own making; nor is it possible to discern from Hurst whether that court 
would have been equally reticent if the rule had been made by a lower court.  
101 560 A.2d 1156 (N.H. 1989). 
102 Id. at 1158. 
103 In re Eduardo L., 621 A.2d 923, 930 (N.H. 1993). 
104 State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 453 (N.D. 2005) (discussing Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)). 
105 Id.  
106 Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting Awadelkariem v. State, 
974 S.W.2d 721, 725 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).  It should be noted that here the court upheld the trial 
court’s admission of the disputed testimony on other grounds rendering this language surplus to the 
case at hand.  Id. at 266. 
107 State v. Shaefer, 746 N.W.2d 457, 490 (Wis. 2008) (footnotes omitted). 
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Finally, in regard to judicial deference to its rulemaking function, the 
Vermont Supreme Court has stated, in dicta, that any considerations of 
changing the law regarding the applicability of the patient privilege to 
involuntary guardianship proceedings “are appropriate for consideration by 
Vermont’s Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence.”108  
A different approach was taken by the Michigan Supreme Court in 
conjunction with its adoption of rules in 1978.  There, the court’s adopting 
order included this language preserving its common law evidence-making 
role: “In adopting these rules, the Court should not be understood as 
foreclosing consideration of a challenge to the wisdom, validity or 
meaning of a rule when a question is brought to the Court judicially or by a 
proposal for a change in a rule.”109  
In spite of this language, it appears that, as a matter of prudence, the 
Michigan court has declined to stray from a rule in deciding an appeal.  In 
Lichon v. American Universal Insurance Co., the issue involved a rule of 
evidence regarding the use of a nolo contendere plea in a criminal action in 
subsequent litigation.110  In asserting its adherence to the rule, the court 
observed: 
The public interest might be served better by a rule that 
prevents an individual who pled nolo contendere to criminal 
charges from excluding evidence of that plea in an action in 
which the pleader seeks to establish some entitlement arising 
out of the crime of which the pleader was convicted.  Such a 
rule, however, would be different from [the] current  
rules . . . .  Such a change in the law would be more properly 
accomplished through our administrative powers to amend 
the Rules of Evidence, because the administrative process 
gives us greater opportunity to deliberate the effects of such a 
change and to gather input from the public, the bench, and 
the bar.111   
With an obviously different point of view in Mississippi, where the 
state supreme court adopted the rules of evidence,112 the court has 
                                                                                                                          
108 In re Guardianship of S.C., 768 A.2d 1290, 1291 (Vt. 2001).  Since the appeal was dismissed 
as moot, however, one cannot be completely certain that the court’s comment reflects deference to its 
rulemaking process or if it was simply a refusal to give an advisory opinion. 
109 See MICH. R. EVID. (1978); see also MINN. R. EVID. §§ 101–102 & historical notes (West 
2006) (reserving the common law power to refine evidentiary standards through case law). 
110 Lichon v. Am. Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288, 290 (Mich. 1990). 
111 Id. at 297.   
112 See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 539 So. 2d 1366, 1371 (Miss. 1989) (stating that the court’s 
“inherent rule-making authority to regulate practice and procedure within the Judicial Branch has long 
been recognized” by the Order Adopting Mississippi Rules of Evidence dated September 24, 1985). 
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exercised the right to amend the rules in a decisional context.113  And, in 
Fisher v. State,114 where the court was dealing with the assertion of a 
spousal testimonial privilege, as provided by Mississippi’s rules of 
evidence, the court reversed the defendant’s capital rape conviction 
because evidence had been adduced at trial in violation of an applicable 
rule.115 Within the contents of the opinion, however, the court 
prospectively amended the pertinent rule to create certain exceptions to the 
spousal privilege rule, which, if in place at the time of the occurrence at 
hand, would have made the evidence under scrutiny admissible.116 
It thus appears that, although some state supreme courts that have 
legislatively adopted codes of evidence have expressly reserved a 
continuing common law right to affect evidentiary law in the decisional 
process, and other courts have suggested the existence of that right, nearly 
all courts have, nevertheless, declined to exercise this authority in the 
context of judicial review of lower court judgments.     
IX.  BRANCH HARMONY AND INTERBRANCH COMITY 
Even if a state’s highest court retains the right to change code-made 
evidence law through adjudication, it would, nevertheless, be beneficial for 
the Connecticut Supreme Court to re-adopt the Code of Evidence.  
Adoption of the code, particularly in consort with the General Assembly, 
would put to rest any doubt that the code is, in fact, a binding set of rules.  
Since its promulgation in 2000 by the judges of the superior court, the CCE 
has served the useful function of being the repository of evidence law that 
relates, primarily, to judicial process.  After State v. DeJesus, however, its 
continued viability as a reliable source of definitive law is suspect because 
the superior court is subject to the supervision of the supreme court.  
As the DeJesus court observed, scholars had noted, before the adoption 
of the Code, that “‘the law of evidence applied in Connecticut courts was 
found [solely] in decisions and rules of the court and in enactments of the 
legislature.’”117  The court also cited with approval a statement in an earlier 
report of the Judiciary that, before the adoption of the Code, “‘[d]isputes 
about evidentiary rules [contributed] to time consuming arguments both at 
the trial court level and on appeals.’”118  A review of appellate decisions 
                                                                                                                          
113 See MISS. CONST. art. 6, § 144; Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1345–46 (Miss. 1989); 
Hudspeth v. State Highway Comm’n, 534 So. 2d 210, 213 (Miss. 1988). 
114 Fisher v. State, 690 So. 2d 268 (Miss. 1996). 
115 Id. at 269. 
116 Id. at 269, 274–75. 
117 State v. DeJesus, 953 A.2d 45, 63–64 (Conn. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting COLIN 
TAIT & HON. ELIOT D. PRESCOTT, TAIT’S HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE xlix (4th ed. 
2008)).  
118 Id. at 64 (alterations in original) (quoting CONN. JUD. DEP’T, 1982–1984 BIENNIAL REPORT 57 
(1984)). 
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since 2000 demonstrates that the Code’s availability to the bench and the 
bar has proven to be beneficial.119   
As a result of the uncertainty following DeJesus regarding the 
continued viability of the CCE, the General Assembly has shown new 
interest in adopting the Code, even though before DeJesus the judicial and 
legislative branches of Connecticut’s government had not experienced 
interbranch uncertainty in dealing with the Code’s promulgation.120  As has 
been noted, most states have resolved the debate over whether the judiciary 
or the legislature should have primary responsibility for the development 
of evidence law through the adoption of judicially-fashioned codes of 
evidence, often with the specific approbation of state legislatures.121  This 
phenomenon represents tacit acknowledgment that judges, often with the 
support of advisory committees comprised of lawyers and judges, are in an 
optimum position to make and amend the evidentiary rules that guide the 
trial process.  While the DeJesus opinion may provide an impetus for the 
supreme court, rather than the superior court, to bear responsibility for the 
Code, there is no basis in the reasoning of DeJesus for altering the judicial 
branch’s primary responsibility in this regard. 
 To be sure, in the growth and development of the Code of Evidence 
by rulemaking, the judiciary must be mindful to avoid areas of evidence 
law that have traditionally been the subject of legislation.  To the extent 
feasible, the Code should consist of rules that are purely procedural except 
where the Code incorporates common law changes in the law of evidence.  
And, to the extent the Code includes rules whose genesis is in legislation, 
                                                                                                                          
119 One manifestation of the utility of the CCE is evident in the frequency of its usage in judicial 
decision-making.  Since the CCE’s adoption in 2000, 332 state appellate and supreme court opinions 
have cited its rules.  See www.loislaw.com (follow “Case Law” hyperlink; then follow “Connecticut 
Appellate Decisions” hyperlink and search for “code of evidence”) (last visited Sept. 22, 2010) 
(subtracting the number of cases referencing the model code of evidence from the gross search results 
to arrive at 322).   
120 Judiciary Committee Co-Chairperson Andrew McDonald questioned Justice Richard Palmer 
during the public hearing on Justice Palmer’s reappointment to the supreme court, and raised the topic 
of the “healthy tension” between the legislature and the judicial branch regarding rules of practice and 
rules of evidence:  
I’ve had the chance to ask some questions of Justice Zarella when he was here 
about the issue.  And it seems pretty clear that the legislature has the authority to 
adopt statutes—or pass statutes that impact on evidentiary issues and, perhaps, even 
adopting an entire code of evidence as a legislative matter.  I guess if that is true—
and let’s accept that as true for a moment—in your mind, is there a distinction 
between the authority of the legislature to adopt rules of evidence and the authority 
of the legislature to adopt rules of practice or to be involved in the rules of practice 
within the court system? 
Conn. Gen. Assemb., Judiciary Comm. Hearing Transcript for Feb. 2, 2009, available at 
http://search.cga.state.ct.us/ (last visited Sept. 23, 2010); see also Conn. Gen. Assemb., Judiciary 
Comm. Hearing Transcript for Jan. 28, 2009, available at http://search.cga.state.ct.us/ (last visited Sept. 
23, 2010) (concerning the reappointment of Justice Joette Katz to the Connecticut Supreme Court, in 
which Committee Chairperson McDonald engaged in a conversation with Justice Katz regarding 
whether it would be prudent for the General Assembly to adopt the CCE).  
121 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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the Code should mirror those statutes unless it is absolutely clear that such 
rules have no implication for substantive rights and it is mandatory, for the 
integrity of the judiciary, that such rules be adopted.122  The experience 
with the Code to date demonstrates that its overseers have shown a 
sensitivity to the limitations of a judicially-promulgated code and a 
concomitant deference to the legislative branch in those areas of evidence 
law that have typically been the subject of legislation.  There is no reason 
to believe this attitude of cooperation would change with the assumption of 
responsibility for the Code by the Connecticut Supreme Court. 
To the contrary, adoption and maintenance of the CCE by the supreme 
court is likely to ensure stability in the law and its orderly development.  
As noted, when the judges of the superior court adopted the code, the 
Evidence Oversight Committee—comprised of judges and lawyers—
formed for the purpose of monitoring the law of evidence by periodically 
updating the Code and making recommendations to the judges of the 
superior court regarding the development of the law of evidence.  As a 
consequence of DeJesus, the committee’s role in the development of the 
law of evidence has been narrowed to updating the Code in accordance 
with appellate decisions and legislation.  To the extent the committee 
believed it was also responsible for making recommendations regarding 
changes in the common law, DeJesus has made it clear that the supreme 
court does not look to the trial bench to enact rules inconsistent with its 
decisional law.  And yet, one benefit of having a code is that the law may 
grow and develop in a thoughtful, inclusive process not dependent on the 
existence of a case whose particular facts may not make the law amendable 
to a beneficial change.  If the supreme court were to re-adopt the CCE, it 
would have the ultimate authority to determine whether to accept or reject 
any recommendations of the Evidence Oversight Committee.  The history 
of other state supreme courts’ deferential treatment of their own 
evidentiary rules in the context of appellate review is reason for the bench 
and bar to be reasonably confident that the Connecticut Supreme Court 
would follow a similar path and defer to its rulemaking process if asked, in 
the context of litigation, to alter a particular rule.  Additionally, the transfer 
                                                                                                                          
122 It is clear from a cursory review of the contents of the Connecticut Code of Evidence that it 
mostly follows this course.  The Code largely consists of rules to ensure a fair and efficient judicial 
process and avoids subjects more traditionally addressed in legislation.  Where the Code includes 
provisions that mirror statutes, an appropriate notation is made.  In this regard, it is noteworthy that 
even though the Code has chapter headings for “Presumptions” and “Privileges,” these chapters contain 
similar notations that, in the case of presumptions, the law “shall be governed by the principles of the 
common law as they may be interpreted in the light of reason and experience” and, in the case of 
privileges, they are to “be governed by the principles of common law.”  CONN. EVID. CODE §§ 3-1, 5-1.  
There are a few rules in the Code that also exist as legislative enactments.  In such cases, the rules 
appear as verbatim recitations of the corresponding legislation.  See, for example, section 4-11, 
“Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual Conduct,” which restates the language of Connecticut’s Rape 
Shield Statute.  Id. § 4-11 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86f (2009)). 
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of authority from the superior court to the supreme court for the 
responsibility for the Code would in no way diminish the legislature’s 
authority to enact evidence laws that flow from public interest and need. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
By their very nature, courts have the inherent authority to promulgate 
rules of practice and procedure, including rules of evidence.  As a matter of 
comity, motivated by ideals of balance of power, a court should act 
unilaterally in asserting its control over the law of evidence only when it is 
necessary to its proper functioning.  Since the law of evidence bridges both 
court procedure and public interests, the development of this law, as a 
shared responsibility, presents an opportunity for interbranch 
cooperation.123  While there may be efficiencies in having all of the law of 
evidence congregated in one judicially-promulgated and developed code, 
the legislature continues to have the right and responsibility to enact 
evidence laws reflecting public interests and policy considerations beyond 
the orderly functioning of the courts.   
Mindful of the legitimate role of the legislature in areas of evidence 
law reflecting public policy, the judiciary should be reticent to assert as 
exclusive an inherent authority over the field just as the legislature should 
be mindful that much of the law of evidence relates, primarily, to judicial 
processes.  In assessing whether particular legislation encroaches on the 
court’s evidence-making function, a 1999 statement of the Michigan 
Supreme Court serves as a useful guide: 
We will not continue mechanically to characterize all statutes 
that resemble rules of evidence as relating solely to practice 
and procedure. . . . We instead adopt a more thoughtful 
analysis that takes into account the undeniable distinction 
between procedural rules of evidence and evidentiary rules 
of substantive law. . . .   
We conclude that a statutory rule of evidence violates 
Const 1963, art 6, § 5 only when no clear legislative policy 
reflecting considerations other than judicial dispatch of 
litigation can be identified.124   
Cooperation between the legislative and judicial branches in the 
development of evidence law reduces the likelihood of interbranch friction 
attendant to unilateral action in this area by either branch.  More than 
                                                                                                                          
123 The Connecticut Supreme Court implicitly recognized this in State v. James: “[T]he rules of 
evidence, including those relating to the competency of witnesses, have never in this state been 
regarded as exclusively within the judicial domain.”  560 A.2d 426, 430 (1989).  
124 McDougall v. Schanz, 597 N.W.2d 148, 155–56 (Mich. 1999) (internal citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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seventy years ago, one commentator observed, in support of judicial 
adoption of rules in cooperation with the legislature, that when the court 
promulgates rules with legislative sanction, “there is a proper balance of 
powers, and the court and legislature will by experience and decisions 
mark at least roughly the boundary between what constitutes procedure and 
what has traditionally been conceived to be exclusively within legislative 
control.”125 
Twenty-five years ago, in response to a claim that a legislative 
enactment was an unconstitutional usurpation of a judicial function, then 
Judge David Borden, later Justice Borden, wrote: 
Within the great edifice of our constitution, the rooms 
assigned to the legislative and judicial magistracies are not 
always separated by impenetrable walls.  Rather, they often 
open onto each other so that each can accommodate the 
proper functions of its occupants and can also properly aid 
the occupants of the neighboring rooms in the proper 
performance of their functions.126 
Within the judicial branch, assumption of responsibility by the 
supreme court for the CCE would improve the orderly development and 
growth of the law of evidence.  Legislative confirmation of the supreme 
court’s authority in this respect would be a clear affirmation of the 
interbranch harmony our constitution contemplates.   
 
                                                                                                                          
125 Silas A. Harris, The Extent and Use of Rule-Making Authority, 22 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y 
27, 29 (1938). 
126 Fishman v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance Co., 494 A.2d 606, 615 (Conn. App. 1985). 
